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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the last three decades, Turkey has contributed significantly to international assistance 
initiatives targeting conflict-affected countries. It has traditionally assumed a role in peacekeeping 
missions. However, since the early 2000s, the Turkish assistance to post-conflict countries seems 
to have shifted dramatically from military missions to civilian capacity assistance. Throughout 
most of the 90s, Turkey deployed significant military forces to the peacekeeping missions in a 
diverse range of countries from Bosnia to Somalia, whereas today while Turkey still remains 
engaged in these places, the nature of its assistance is more civilian than military.  In fact, a careful 
examination of Turkish foreign policy hints that Turkey will expand on its current technical and 
civilian assistance to conflict-affected countries in the years ahead.  
Keeping up with this change in Turkey’s approach to post-conflict assistance, this study offers 
useful information and key observations on the nature and boundaries of Turkish civilian 
capacity.  The authors of the study gathered invaluable data on the type of assistance Turkey has 
provided so far in the five fundamental clusters of post-conflict reconstruction (basic services, 
government functionality, basic safety and security, inclusive political processes, economic 
revitalization). The interviews conducted at the Turkish foreign ministry and various aid 
coordination offices revealed extremely useful data on the Civilian Capacity processes covering 
a wide range of vital decisions - from the selection of potential recipients to the amount of 
aid, the type of assistance to the design and deployment of civilian capacity. The knowledge 
accrued from these meetings was instrumental in understanding how Turkey regards civilian 
capacity assistance from an international perspective. Furthermore, we were able to construct 
a formidable case on Afghanistan, demonstrating Turkish civilian capacity deployment at work 
in the past five years.  More important, the study helped spot a number of critical impediments 
that must be overcome in the near future to sustain and expand Turkey’s civilian assistance to 
conflict-affected countries and the subsequent policy implications. 
These interviews with the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish International 
Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) helped the authors to identify Turkey’s approach 
to civilian capacity deployment from an international point of view. Through these sessions, the 
authors obtained valuable information on the strengths and weaknesses of its decision-making 
system.  They also gained insight into successful civilian assistance cases such as Afghanistan 
and their implications for the future endeavors the Turkish CIVCAP initiative may embark 
upon.  The interviews with experts, coupled with prolific desk research on the depth and breadth 
of Turkish civilian capacity, yielded the following critical assessments that will be discussed and 
explained in more detail in relevant sections.  First, a thorough examination of government 
policies regarding the deployment of Turkish civilian capacity demonstrates that Turkish 
foreign policy priorities factor in Turkey’s strategic choices regarding its CIVCAP deployment.  
Second, there is a pattern among the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious characteristics 
of the countries to which Turkey lends its civilian support. Third, Turkey appears not to have 
an institutionalized decision-making system when it comes to the deployment of its civilian 
capacity.  The lack of an integrated approach, which would be governed through essential rules of 
conduct, is likely to complicate the efforts of the main coordination agency in deploying civilian 
assistance and evaluating the success rate of its programs.  Furthermore, the study also points 
to a general confusion over civilian capacity assistance and technical assistance. Our interviews 
and extended investigations have shown that the majority of Turkey’s contributions to conflict-
affected areas actually constitute technical assistance that fall within the “basic services” cluster. 
They come in the form of construction, infrastructure, agriculture and cultural reconciliation 
projects. Nevertheless, our case study on Afghanistan also illustrates a great potential and almost 
limitless boundaries of Turkish civilian capacity when it is coordinated efficiently. 
In summary, Turkey has a marvelous vision to provide for more countries in-need through 
civilian capacity assistance.  However, to fulfill that potential, it should carry out due reforms 
on its institutions and civilian capacity infrastructure. It would be in its interest to set in place 
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capacity, Turkey would also need an effective monitoring and evaluation protocol. Through 
these procedures, it would be easier for the relevant agencies and government offices to ensure 
the quality of their civilian assistance.  Turkey would also benefit from engaging with a diverse 
set of recipient countries, which do not necessarily share a common ethnic, cultural, linguistic, 
or religious heritage. Furthermore, the agencies that are tasked with the coordination of civilian 
capacity can be more amenable to welcoming NGO involvement and be more open to work in 
a multilateral framework that involves the United Nations as well as influential international 
organizations.  Last, but not least, Turkey may consider finding ways to further tap into its vast 
domestic resource of civilian capacity.  We believe these shifts would significantly help Turkey 
transition from being a technical assistance supplier into a civilian capacity provider. In effect, 
Turkey would carry out more substantive projects in the remaining four clusters of post-conflict 
assistance.  
The subsequent sections will shed light on some of these issues and offer humble solutions.  
The first section will touch upon the historical events that played a role in molding Turkey’s 
approach to CIVCAP both internationally and domestically.  The second section will dwell on 
the common characteristics of some of the countries in which Turkey has deployed civilian 
assistance.  The next section will provide an unabridged look into the decision-making and 
coordination facilities of civilian capacity assistance in Turkey. It will identify this mechanism’s 
strengths and weaknesses.  The fourth section will analyze the Afghanistan case, which shall 
capture the aforementioned characteristics of Turkish civilian capacity at play.  The final section 
will lay out the future scenarios, challenges and opportunities awaiting Turkish civilian capacity 
assistance. 
I. TURKEY’S APPROACH TO CIVILIAN CAPACITY WITHIN WIDER 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORKS
The terminology that the Turkish government uses to define its civilian capacity (CIVCAP) 
assistance is a convincing indicator of the strong relationship between its civilian capacity 
development efforts and Turkey’s foreign policy goals. Referred to as “global development 
diplomacy efforts,” or “development cooperation efforts,” Turkey’s CIVCAP initiatives are 
increasingly viewed as useful tools to achieve key Turkish foreign policy priorities such as 
fostering peace and stability in its region and strengthening its soft power over its neighbors and 
traditional international partners. In fact, Turkey’s proactive foreign policy initiatives have been 
a driving force for its evolution from being an aid recipient country to a dynamic and cooperative 
player in the international donor community.  When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
came to power in 2002, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to develop a strategic, 
multi-dimensional, and balanced humanitarian oriented foreign policy for the expressed 
purpose of restoring or maintaining peace and security – particularly in Turkey’s neighboring 
countries.  As an extension of these policies, Turkey has positioned itself as a forerunner in 
the building of regional stability.  Not only have officials utilized soft power instruments such 
as mediating roles in regional conflicts, Turkey continues to employ its resources for “global 
development diplomacy efforts” in countries affected by conflicts and natural disasters. 
Historical Context for Development Cooperation Efforts
When Turkey transitioned from a single party to multi-party rule in the 1950s, access to 
development assistance became available through the Marshall Plan. Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) helped to lay a strong foundation for Turkey’s growth in economic performance 
between 1960 until the end of 2007; major contributors were the United States, Japan, and 
Germany. Bilateral and multi-lateral channels also contributed to Turkey’s development such as 
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the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Asian Development Fund (ADF), and the 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).  Although Turkey remained 
a donor recipient during this timeframe, the country launched the first official phase of its 
own official development assistance program in 1985 under the auspices of the Turgut Özal 
government’s State Planning Organization.  
Özal’s foreign policy priorities were three-fold; bolstering Turkey’s economic strength by 
integrating into the world economy, promoting a more positive image of Turkey worldwide, and 
using aid as an effective mechanism to enhance trade and soft power relations in developing 
countries.  Focusing on the Sahel countries, a comprehensive aid package worth approximately 
$10 million was implemented in 1985 to develop institutional capacity in Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somali, and Sudan. During the latter part of the 80s, 
Turkey benefited from an expansion of its economy because of its export-oriented growth 
strategy. New markets emerged and continued to be identified.  Former TIKA President Musa 
Kulaklikaya speculates that perhaps because Turkey’s standard of living began to increase, policy 
makers may have become more amenable to looking beyond their own borders and addressing 
international issues such as the alleviation of poverty through aid distribution.  Özal’s foreign 
policy objectives began to converge; Turkey’s economic expansion strengthened the country and 
increased its soft power in strategic regions, while its humanitarian efforts enhanced a positive 
image throughout the world.  The confluence of these three-fold objectives was conceptually 
generative, and has since shaped the direction of Turkey’s foreign policy, particularly as it relates 
to development assistance initiatives.    
By the early 90s, the dismantling of the former Soviet Union had occurred, wars and upheaval 
in the Balkans were mounting, and a rapidly changing international environment provoked a 
clarifying shift in Turkey’s foreign assistance. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
and the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the geopolitical realities 
–particularly in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Balkan regions– opened up opportunities for 
Turkey to establish closer ties with some of the countries in this region.  Given Turkey’s own 
experience as an ODA recipient, the leadership at the time understood the relationship between 
state security and economic stability and began using various forms of “assistance” to promote 
its presence.  It was in this dynamic context that Turkey moved into a second phase of its 
foreign policy/assistance strategy: development cooperation efforts. Not only was the country 
strategically positioned to affect change and advance its interests in the region, Turkey could 
also take advantage of its strong historical, cultural, and linguistic ties throughout these areas 
from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Official development assistance had now become an 
integral part of Turkey’s foreign policy.
Founding of TIKA
Turkish leaders believed that development cooperation efforts would be more effectively 
administered through the establishment of an official state sponsored agency.  In 1992, the 
Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was officially established. 
Its original mission was to meet the immediate needs of Eurasian countries; the first field offices were 
opened in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Initial interest in playing an active role in the transformation 
of post-Soviet space was limited to the countries where Turkey had an ethnic, cultural, religious, and 
historical appeal. Turkey was in a unique position to present itself as a “secular role model” for these 
new republics.  The government’s first step was to establish good relations with the post-Soviet Turkic 
Republics, and then to create a new zone of influence for itself.  In other words, Turkey offered its 
development cooperation efforts as a way to also exercise its political and economic influence. In fact, 
President Özal described the importance of this opportunity in a speech given to the Turkish National 
Assembly, stressing that “Turkey should not miss this unique occasion that presented itself for the first 
time in the past 400 years.”
4When it was originally founded, TIKA’s objectives were to “provide technical and cultural support 
to newly independent Turkic republics, focus on Turkic solidarity in substantive and symbolic 
ways, and to collect and report ODA statistics of Turkey to the OECD.”  TIKA defined development 
cooperation efforts as “a significant instrument that allows new avenues for classical diplomacy in 
economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian fields.”  Highest priority was given to the areas of culture, 
economy, and energy.  Essentially, TIKA became an intermediary agency, coordinating interactions 
between Turkey and the Turkic states in the spheres of banking, training of officials, and establishing 
technological networks. In other words, TIKA acted as a “bridge between the activities of businessmen 
and others in Turkey eager to develop closer links with the Turkic states.”  At this point, strategic 
political considerations, as well as trade concerns, were the dominant forces driving Turkey’s proactive 
development cooperation efforts.
Within a few years, Turkey became better positioned to understand the diplomatic nuances within these 
regions, identify the financial resources necessary to meet the needs of these new states, and to further 
develop the operational side of the organization.  When the Justice and Development Party came to 
power in 2002 – and in particular under the direction of 2009 appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ahmet Davutoğlu – a new era in Turkey’s official development assistance began, which was coined 
global development diplomacy efforts.  Aid assistance remained directly linked to the government’s 
foreign policy priorities which currently include:  (a) a visionary vs. crisis orientation, (b) a consistent 
and systematic framework, and (c) the use of soft power in political rhetoric and action.   Although 
Turkey retains a strong military due to the instability of the region, the AKP government has chosen 
to highlight civic-economic power as a more sustainable way to develop constructive diplomacy.  
Six operational objectives undergird the ideological basis for the AKP’s foreign affairs and inform 
the relationship between foreign policy, humanitarian aid, and CIVCAP development cooperative 
projects in de-stabilized and/or post-conflict regions. They include: a balance between security and 
freedom, “zero problem with Turkey’s neighbors,” proactive peace diplomacy, strong global relations, 
active involvement in international issues, and cooperation with all international organizations.  
AKP’s foreign policy interests were no longer limited to post-Soviet countries, and the government 
began to strategically pursue development of social/religious/cultural ties within the Balkans, Black 
Sea, Middle East and North African countries or region, Asia, Latin America and the Sub-Saharan 
African countries. At the same time, Turkey also expanded the scope of its international networks 
such as participating in the UN Security Council, the Islamic Cooperation Organization, G-20, and 
South/South Initiatives. During the past decade, Turkey’s foreign policies have continued to bolster a 
commitment to development cooperation efforts, and as such – TIKA’s role has expanded. The next 
section of this report will describe ways in which TIKA 2012 reflects Turkish Foreign Minister H.E. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s reflexive foreign policy as well as how the institution operationalizes its role as the 
intermediary between the Turkish Government and donor-recipient countries. 
Turkey’s Current Foreign Policy and TIKA
Turkey uses TIKA’s development diplomacy efforts as one of its most effective soft power 
tools.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long recognized that the use of official development 
assistance is a peaceful and humanitarian-focused mechanism to advance the country’s 
interests in regional and international affairs. Although we will more thoroughly explore 
Turkey’s intervention in war-torn Afghanistan as the primary CIVCAP case study, we mention 
it here as a strong illustration of how Turkey’s foreign policy and global development efforts 
have converged, expressing commitment to the principle of establishing balance between 
security and freedom through the use of soft power action. To quickly summarize, under the 
auspices of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Turkey has supported the establishment 
of Afghanistan’s domestic stability by focusing its development assistance on the reconstruction 
of civil infrastructures and through the provision of basic services.  By attending to the basic 
human needs of Afghan citizens, Turkey is helping to generate a new system of governance 
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based upon the respect of basic human freedoms and civil liberties.  TIKA’s three civilian 
administered field operations offices - located in Kabul, Mazari-i Sharif, and Wardak, work in 
close cooperation with the Turkish Embassy in Afghanistan.
Turkey’s visionary orientation and commitment to the use of a systematic framework in 
cooperation with international organizations is evinced through its strong participation in 
UNDP South-South Cooperation, and Triangular, Regional, and Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) initiatives.  Through its 2005 “Opening Up to Africa” policy, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has more recently shifted development assistance priorities to include several de-stabilized 
regions in sub-Saharan Africa.  In the past eight years, TIKA has worked alongside leadership in 
several countries to generate “Master Development Plans,” which are long term strategies aimed 
at infusing local economies and empowering citizens through sustainable capacity building.  
Examples include agricultural and fishing projects in Djibouti, health care initiatives in Sudan, 
and seed distribution in Darfur.  As these Master Development Plans evolve, TIKA acts as a 
liaison between Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, various intergovernmental organizations, 
and relevant ministries or local agencies within partner countries.  Sharing knowledge and 
experience are at the heart of TIKA’s development policies.  Global development diplomacy 
efforts continue to reflect a belief in the immense benefits of transferring best practices and 
expertise (capacity building) through private sector involvement in order to achieve long term, 
sustained success.  
In addition to building capacity in de-stabilized regions in Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey has also 
been actively engaged in proactive peace diplomacy through international humanitarian efforts 
aimed at mitigating the conditions of fragile environments and post-conflict contexts.  Since 
2008, TIKA has organized nearly 100 million USD of emergency aid to Iraq, along with the 
equipment, food, shelter, and medical supplies sent to Georgia after its conflict with Russia, as 
well as to the Palestinians suffering under the Israeli blockade.  In 2011-2012, Turkey became 
extensively involved in efforts aimed at reducing the impact of conflict, severe drought, and 
famine within Somalia. Turkey strongly believes that it is a moral, ethical, and internationally 
shared responsibility to address the adverse effects of war and violence upon innocent civilians, 
and it also recognizes that human security is ultimately linked to regional and global peace. 
II. DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY’S ENGAGEMENT WITH RECIPIENT 
COUNTRIES 
In the last five years, Turkey has provided invaluable assistance to a large number of recipient 
countries.  These states hail from quite broad and diverse geographies, ranging from the Balkans 
to Southeast Asia.  Yet, in spite of the wide spaces and insurmountable distances separating these 
territories from each other, a number of their key characteristics converge.  A closer look at these 
countries thus reveals a pattern about the fundamental political, social, and ideological attributes 
of the states that Turkey has engaged so far.  As the detailed descriptions of these countries and 
the type of assistance they have received will demonstrate in the following sections, the recipients 
generally have a Muslim population, exposure to the former Ottoman sphere of influence, and/or 
ties to Turkic cultural heritage.  
The scope of Turkey’s foreign policies and development assistance capacity has dramatically 
shifted in the past twenty-five years.  The pairing of AKP’s principled approach alongside 
TIKA’s efforts has helped promote peace and stability, economic prosperity, and lasting security 
throughout the region.  Turkey is aware that “peace” is realized through a dynamic relationship 
between political stability, economic welfare, and human security; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
does not differentiate between them in its understanding of “humanitarian assistance.” Bi-lateral 
partnerships are aligned and guided by shared values that will ultimately promote and protect 
this pervasive understanding of peace.  We begin by offering a short description of Turkey’s 
6foreign policy in key regions.  Next, we identify the post-conflict or destabilized countries within 
those regions in which TIKA has been working since 2007.  Additionally we note CIVCAP data 
(budget/deployment) along with examples of Turkey’s global development diplomacy efforts. For 
additional information, (please) see Annex I.
The Balkans
In the Balkans, disintegration of the former Yugoslavia created immense regional instability 
between 1990-2008.  Rising nationalism, ethnic cleansing and devastating wars threatened 
international peace, eventually requiring international intervention.  Although agreements were 
signed and new states have emerged, the region continues to face post-conflict challenges.  The 
Balkans is a priority for Turkey because of its geographic proximity, trade opportunities, and due 
of its historic, cultural and humanitarian ties.  Bonds between the peoples of Turkey and some 
Balkan countries are centuries old.  For all of these reasons, any crisis in the region is felt deeply.  
Turkey’s commitment to Balkan peace and stability is reflected in the government’s strong support 
of international civil (UNMIK, EULEX, EUPOL) and military missions (KFOR, EUFOR), multi-
lateral efforts (SEECP, RCC), as well as development cooperation assistance efforts funded by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro are the primary 
recipients of Turkish development assistance in the Balkans.  A common characteristic of these 
countries is that almost all of them have either a majority Muslim populations, or Muslim minorities.  
Most of these countries also are home to ethnic Turks. In the case of Albania, for instance, due to 
its close proximity, there are a large number of Turkish citizens of Albanian origin or Albanians 
who have chosen to live in Turkey for the purposes of education, health care, and employment. 
Likewise, there is a growing Turkic population settling in Albania. Similarly, Bosnia is home to a 
large population of Muslims and ethnic Turks; not to mention that it was the epicenter of a tragic 
civil war that sparked between the two ethnic groups from the smoldering ashes of the former 
Yugoslav republic. By the same token, there are approximately twenty thousand Kosovar citizens of 
Turkish origin in Kosovo.  The two countries have a long and shared history.  Moreover, one cannot 
ignore the presence of the ethnic Turks and Muslims living in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. 
Albania and Kosovo aside, the remaining Balkan countries receive development assistance from 
Turkey.  A significant portion of this comes as technical assistance in the basic services cluster. 
Albania and Kosovo stand out because, in addition to basic services assistance, they also are the 
recipients of significant military assistance.  There is a comprehensive dimension of Turkish-
Albanian cooperation in the field of defense; Turkish Land, Naval, and Air Forces have been 
training Albanian armed forces and supporting them logistically.  Turkey considers Albania as a 
strategically important country for enduring peace and security in the Balkans.  Kosovo, too, is a 
principal destination recipient of Turkish military assistance, since Turkey sees this country as an 
indispensable element of peace and stability in Europe. As such, 500 Turkish military personnel 
are present in the Turkish Battalion, which has been operating within the NATO KFOR Mission 
since 1999. At the Lisbon Summit on December 2007, the EU decided to establish a civilian 
mission (EULEX) that was envisioned to operate on matters of penal law and security in Kosovo. 
EULEX officially started its operations on 9 December 2008. Turkey participates in the EULEX 
mission as a “potential participating third country.”  At present, 1 Turkish judge and 100 Turkish 
police officers are taking part in EULEX.
The projects that Turkey undertakes in these countries can be classified under the following 
five categories: Development of social and economic infrastructure, financing infrastructure 
and construction projects, development of education infrastructure, extending humanitarian 
assistance and donating equipment,  promoting Turkic cultural cooperation (see Annex). The 
activities that fall within these categories consist of distribution of food, carpet/rug weaving/
training courses for women, water supply/sanitation, irrigation, rehabilitation of water ducts, 
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establishing educational institutions, short and long term training programs and higher education 
scholarships for medicine students, doctors and medical personnel, establishment of a children’s 
dialysis center, construction of a blood bank, and equipment support for mentally disabled 
persons. Turkey has also invested in human development in these countries.  It has relied on its 
advantages in certain endogenous sectors such as agriculture.  Especially in Kosovo, Albania and 
Bosnia, Turkish experts have trained the locals in organic farming, apiculture, development of 
modern greenhouses, modern fishery techniques.  Perhaps one of the most valuable assistance 
programs has been the microfinance credits and farming training provided to women who wanted 
to acquire the necessary skills to contribute to their household economy.  
Turkey has also made funds available for fostering its existing cultural ties with the ethnic Turks 
and Muslims living in the Balkans.  This has manifested the mushrooming of cultural centers 
and schools that promote and teach Turkish heritage and language. In Albania, the Gülistan 
Foundation, the Turgut Özal Schools, and the Sema Foundation see to it that students of Turkish 
ethnicity and Muslim faith get an opportunity to learn about their common Turkish heritage and 
the virtues of Islam.  Similarly, Turkish construction teams have built or restored many mosques, 
holy sites of various sects of Islam, museums, and religious learning and cultural centers.  These 
projects are available in detail in the Annex.  
In terms of civilian capacity training, the figures from 2008 and 2009 numbers indicated that 
nearly 5000 civilians from these countries received training in Turkey in many fields. Moreover, 
Turkish government provided development aid surpassing $200 million within the same period.  
South Caucasus 
Turkey’s priorities towards the South Caucasus include the maintenance of regional security and 
stability. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports the independence, territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the South Caucasus countries and encourages their integration into European 
and Euro-Atlantic structures as well as other international organizations. Ankara is mindful 
that the closed border with Armenia limits Turkey’s presence and influence in the South 
Caucasus.  The strategic importance of this area has increased with regional projects such as the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline (2006), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline 
(2007) and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway (2007). Furthermore, because the Southern Caucasus 
is an intersection between East, West, North and South – importance for the attainment of 
stability and prosperity of Eurasia has steadily increased.  Unresolved conflicts, namely the 
conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, constitute important threats to 
both the region’s and Eurasia’s security. Turkey believes that peaceful settlement of conflicts in 
the Caucasus will contribute to the political stability and economic prosperity of these countries 
and open up new possibilities for bilateral and regional cooperation.
Azerbaijan and Georgia are the main recipients of Turkish development aid in the region. 
Strong foreign relations with Azerbaijan are the backbone of Turkey’s policy towards the 
South Caucasus and post-Soviet space. This is largely driven by ethnic/cultural identity and 
kinship factors. When TIKA was established in 1990s, the primary objective was to support 
the development processes of the Turkic countries, and Azerbaijan became the most important 
country in this process. Azerbaijan continues to attract significant investment, technical 
support and development aid from Turkey. Similarly, stability in Georgia is vital in the process 
of Turkey’s ability to attain its vision of becoming a regional energy hub.  Currently the country 
is troubled by the South Ossetia and Abkhazia tensions.  Turkey defends the territorial integrity 
of Georgia and promotes peaceful settlement of these conflicts. Similar to Azerbaijan, Georgia 
receives significant technical support and aid from Turkey.
The Turkish technical assistance geared towards these countries has mainly contributed to the 
development of their social, economic and education infrastructures.  In Azerbaijan, Turkey 
8introduced a network of state-of-the-art statistical research technologies in nine industrial 
regions, implemented a four-phase organized industrial zone, helped foster journalistic and 
media standards, and provided both technical and financial support for the establishment 
of modern computer libraries and reading lounges in Azerbaijan. Currently, 800 Turkish 
companies operate in this close neighbor of Turkey. In Georgia, Turkish civilian teams have 
renovated schools, undertook water sanitation projects, improved village water supply systems 
and provided financial assistance to the improvement of village health facilities.  
In sum, more than 2000 Azerbaijanis and Georgians received civilian capacity development 
training in Turkey and approximately 1000 Turkish civilians traveled to Azerbaijan and Georgia 
to give training between 2007 and 2009. 
The Middle East
Turkey recognizes that stability in the Middle East is critical to international peace.  The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs has been intent on pursuing its strategy of its development of bilateral and 
multilateral platforms with several countries; however, reverberations of the Arab Spring have 
challenged Turkey’s objectives in the region. The government has problematic relations with 
Israel and Syria, and its diplomatic efforts with Iran and the central authority of Baghdad are 
also unstable.  On the other hand, Turkey has a strong tie with the Palestine National Authority 
and has extended significant development aid assistance to Palestine.  Although Turkey’s 
relationship with Iraq is mercurial, it remains one of Turkey’s largest aid recipients. 
Turkey has been deeply affected by the complexities of problems arising from wars and 
instability within Iraq over the past few decades.  As such, restoration of stability in Iraq is 
one of the top priorities in Turkish foreign policy.  Political reconciliation is considered key if 
Iraq is to emerge as a secure and stable neighbor.  Elimination of the PKK’s presence in Iraq is 
a critical component of Turkish-Iraqi bilateral relations and is the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s 
foremost security objective. The nature of Turkish development aid to Iraq has been threefold: 
humanitarian assistance in the form of food, medicine, and tent aid through the Turkish Red 
Crescent Society; development aid for vital production sectors such as agriculture (pesticide 
application tools and equipment); and financing infrastructure and construction projections 
(health clinic in Baghdad).  The 2007 figures tell us that Turkey trained nearly 250 Iraqi civilians 
within its territory, while it deployed 140 Turkish civilians to train Iraqis in Iraq. The same 
statistics from 2007, coupled with that of 2008 and 2009, indicate that Turkish government 
committed close to $150 million in development aid to Iraq, 
The Palestinian National Authority is another high-profile target of Turkish humanitarian 
assistance. Turkey has shared centuries of close cultural, social, and historical bonds with the 
Palestinian people. The government established official relations with the Palestine Liberation 
Organization in 1975 and was one of the first countries to recognize the Palestinian State when it 
was established in exile.  Turkey-Palestine (PNA) has continued to enjoy bilateral cooperation on 
a variety of levels since its founding. TIKA opened a branch in Ramallah in 2005 to ensure more 
effective and on site coordination of the development assistance initiatives aimed at improving 
the living conditions of the Palestinian people.  It works primarily through IHH, the Turkish Red 
Crescent, WFP, TIPH, and UNRWA in this region. TIKA’s focus is “acute humanitarian need” 
such as health, education, agricultural development, food security, infrastructure, and problems 
related to clean water.  The total amount of development assistance provided to Palestine 
directly from government to government or indirectly through international organizations like 
the UNRWA and the WFP since 1995 is well over $100 million (this figure includes Turkey’s 
assistance in goods or in cash to Palestine in a wide spectrum of fields).  
The areas into which Turkish development aid has been channeled in the last five years have 
been agriculture, education, infrastructure, and construction sectors. Especially in agriculture, 
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Turkish know-how has been indispensable in the cultivation of olive trees, training the locals 
in pest and disease prevention, in new plantations and increasing their knowledge in seedling 
production.  With respect to education, Turkey has carried out similar activities to those it 
has conducted in the Balkans.  It has constructed a research library at al-Aqsa University, 
renovated a few mosques. Yet, Turkey’s most critical support in revitalizing of the basic 
Palestinian infrastructure has been the construction of drainage systems, and potable water 
stations. Moreover, Turkey has committed formidable financial assistance to the procurement 
of ambulances for hospitals in the West Bank. Similarly, another Turkish construction company 
built the biggest hospital in Gaza (the Gaza-Turkish Palestine Friendship Hospital).  Today 
the Gaza–Turkish Palestine Friendship Hospital treats a large number of disabled refugees and 
other victims of the conflict between Israel and Palestine.  To date, Turkey has also shown 
its goodwill by shipping staple nutrients to feed nearly 130,000 families, through its Disaster 
and Emergency Management Office. It has trained close to one thousand Palestinian civilians 
within its borders between 2007 and 2009 while it provided official financial aid in the shape of 
approximately $80 million from 2007 and 2009.  
Lebanon is another vital Middle Eastern country that has received substantive technical 
and financial assistance from Turkey. From Turkey’s point of view, Lebanon plays a key role 
in maintaining stability in the Middle East.  On the regional level, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs took a cautious but proactive stance as Lebanon struggled through a war in 2006 as 
well as political tensions in 2008. In particular, Turkey looks to Lebanon to support a fair 
and constructive attitude on solving tensions in the Arab-Israeli issue. Turkey has supported 
Lebanese reconstruction and development by financing crucial infrastructure and construction 
projects.  Chief among these undertakings are health clinics, revitalization of Lebanese economic 
infrastructure and services emergency repair program. Another major area where Turkish 
technical and financial aid has been funneled is in school construction and curriculum design 
programs.  In total, Lebanon received over $50 million in official aid from Turkish government 
in the 2007 – 2010 period.  It was the third largest recipient of TIKA aid in 2010. 
Central Asia
Central Asia became a foreign policy priority immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union.  As 
previously mentioned, Turkey was eager to establish ties with Central Asian Republics because 
of its common linguistic, historical, and cultural heritage. In fact, it was through Turkish 
government initiatives that the Nakhichevan Treaty concerning the Establishment of the 
Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States was signed in 2009. Economic relations between 
Turkey and Central Asia grew rapidly in the early 90s, but emphasis was also placed on culture 
and education.  The International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) was established 
for the purpose of protecting Turkic culture, art, language and heritage in order to protect and 
import those values to younger generations.  Several Turkish educational institutions operate 
throughout Central Asia including The Turkish-Kazakh International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi 
University which operates in Kazakhstan and the Turkish-Kyrgyz Manas University which is 
located in Kyrgyzstan. Turkey shares particular concerns about destabilizing factors such as 
extremist movements, drug and arms trafficking, and terrorist activities within the Central 
Asian Republics.  As such, the government provides financial assistance and military training 
to these countries alongside its development capacity assistance.   
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are the primary recipients 
of Turkish civilian, technical, and financial assistance. Turkey was the first country to recognize 
the independence of these nations in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse.  After Russia, Turkey 
stands as the principal trade and economic partner of the majority of these countries.  Strong 
linguistic, religious, ethnic, historical and cultural ties between Turkey and the Commonwealth 
of Independent Countries contribute to the strength in bi-lateral endeavors with many of these 
nations.
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Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are the two Central Asian countries where Turkey remains 
overwhelmingly engaged through cultural projects that honor the common Turkic roots of the 
three actors.  The restoration of the Hodja Ahmet Yesevi Tomb and the investments in the Kazakh-
Turkish University and the Talgar high school in Kazakhstan attest to this fact. Furthermore, 
in Turkmenistan, Turkey has demonstrated the high value it attaches to this common ancestry 
by assuming responsibility for the restoration of Sultan Sancar’s Tomb. Kazakhstan has also 
received significant civilian assistance from Turkey to implement important training programs 
at its justice ministry.  A highly qualified Turkish team traveled to Kazakhstan to train Kazakh 
prosecutors at the government’s Justice Academy. Equally important is the technical assistance 
provided to the Kazakh Statistics Agency.  
Turkey has made additional valuable contributions to the economic, infrastructure, and 
development projects in the region such as the establishment of a Bone Marrow Transplant Centre, 
Statistics Development Project, Kyrgyz Manuscript Project, Aktilek State School construction 
in Kyrgyzstan; raising yields in cotton through triangular cooperation, establishment of a 
potable water supply network, animal breeding in Tajikistan; and establishing poultry farming 
(facilities and training), pistachio farming and husbandry, seed registry and certification system 
in Turkmenistan. Over 2000 civilians from these countries spent time in Turkey to receive 
training in civilian capacity development, and well over a thousand Turkish civilians provided 
similar trainings in these five prominent Central Asian countries. The official Turkish aid that 
went to these countries over the four years from 2007 to 2010 comes up to nearly half billion 
US dollars. 
South Asia
Turkey’s historic and cultural bounds to South Asian countries are strong. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs recognizes and monitors instability in the region and seeks to enhance relations 
through cooperative efforts with South Asian countries in order to contribute to regional peace 
and stability.  In particular, Turkey places sharp focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs has been a very active player in Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction 
and as such, Afghanistan has been Turkey’s biggest development aid recipient for the last several 
years.  Following the downfall of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan was prioritized at the top of 
Turkey’s development cooperation agenda.  Focus was placed on reconstruction, provision of 
services, governance based upon respect of basic liberties and the re-establishment of domestic 
order.  In the following section of this report, a more in-depth explanation and analysis of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/TIKA’s efforts is offered.  
Turkey considers Pakistan as one of the most prominent players affecting security and stability 
in the region.  For several decades, the two countries have supported each other through various 
wars and independence efforts.  Affinity is strong.  Turkey provided humanitarian assistance to 
Pakistan following the 2005 and 2008 earthquakes, and in 2010 the government sent large scale 
humanitarian and financial aid to address the needs of people who were affected by the flood.  
Turkey works through strong bi-lateral relations as it pursues peace and stability in the region.  
For example, the government has organized multilateral processes such as Turkey-Pakistan-
Afghanistan Trilateral Summits, and Friends of Democratic Pakistan.
Turkey has undertaken major financing infrastructure and construction projects in Pakistan. 
It has built an eye clinic and dispatched experts, technical personnel and provided necessary 
training and equipment for various programs.  It also delivered a number of poverty alleviation 
projects that included goat and cow breeding, mango farming, skill development programs.  
These efforts have also targeted initiatives that are aimed at encouraging an increase the 
standards of living for rural women.  Pakistan received close to $150 million in official aid from 
Turkey from 2007 to 2009.  In 2007, 61 Turkish civilians provided training in Pakistan. 
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Africa
The AKP’s shift in foreign policy orientation is especially apparent in its opening to new 
partnerships in Africa.  For purposes of this report, we are not dividing the continent into 
regions, but it is important to note that Turkey has historically differentiated between North 
African countries and those in the Sub-Saharan regions due to residual cultural ties from 
Ottoman-times.   In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Turkey has attempted to deepen its 
relationship with transitioning countries such as Egypt and Libya by being diplomatically 
supportive of the newly forming governments.  Concerning Sub-Saharan countries, Turkey 
has more recently changed its approach, and is now making substantial economic and social 
development investment in the region.
Although Turkey’s development ties to Sub-Saharan Africa can be traced back to its comprehensive 
aid package to the Sahel countries in 1985, the AKP has recently begun to place heavier policy 
emphasis on the continent.  In 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began to 
promote the “Opening Up to Africa” framework, which had been slowly developing since 1998. 
The AKP’s current development capacity assistance is not just based upon economic and trade 
objectives, but is also realized through technical and project assistance in areas that, in particular, 
support health, education, water, sanitation, vocational training, institutional capacity building, 
and humanitarian assistance. TIKA assists in the coordination of initiatives such as the “Africa 
Agricultural Development Programme”, “Africa Health Programme” and the “Africa Vocational 
Training Programme” - which are multi-country efforts specifically designed to meet the needs 
of African countries.  It operates in Africa out of three offices (Addis Ababa, Dakar, Nairobi), 
but has worked on projects in 37 different African countries.  Somalia and Sudan are the two 
conflict/de-stabilized countries in which TIKA’s CIV/CAP efforts are most concentrated (see 
below for data).
Turkey also provides aid to Africa through international organizations such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP) and the Red Crescent.  Additionally, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has supported police and military efforts by sending personnel/
troops to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, including the UN Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUC), the hybrid AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and the UN Mission in 
Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI). Since early 2009, the Turkish navy has also been part of the United 
States-led Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, a multinational naval force carrying out anti-piracy 
operations off the coast of Somalia. 
Since Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit in 2011, Somalia has been the capstone of Turkish 
development aid, technical and civilian assistance in Africa. Turkey believes that the construction 
of national unity is a precondition for building statehood in Somalia and establishing regional 
stability in the Horn of Africa.   There have been close relations between the two countries 
since the Ottoman Empire, and Turkey attaches great significance to Somalia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. During the 2012 Istanbul II Conference on Somalia, Turkey took an active 
role by inviting international partners to invest in initiatives that will ultimately strengthen 
economic development in Somalia while at the same time develop vitally needed infrastructures 
such as:  access to energy, drinkable water, repair of roads, and capacity building within governing 
institutions.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs encouraged a participatory and comprehensive 
approach to economic reconstruction and social development between the public and private 
sectors because it believes this will contribute to national cohesion and regional stability.  
NGOs that are active in Somalia include Doctors Worldwide, TIKA, Kimse Yok Mu, the Turkish 
Red Crescent, Humanitarian Relief Foundation, Islamic Relief, and the Physicians for Hope 
Foundation. Turkish NGOs operate refugee camps in Mogadishu. The Gülen-affiliated Nile 
Foundation of Turkey signed an agreement with TIKA to enhance the education system in Somalia 
over a 49-year period and has opened the first Turkish high school in Somalia. The Turkish 
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initiatives that have been carried out so far in Somalia have concentrated on capacity building 
in governmental institutions, assisting civil society and local leadership in defining priorities for 
their respective regions, developing a vocational training school, initiating investments in access 
to energy, potable water, treatment of over 200,000 Somalis at Turkish field hospitals and clinics. 
During the same trip, Prime Minister Erdoğan asked the major Turkish airport construction 
company, TAV, to take over the reconstruction of the Somali National Airport in Mogadishu. 
Other projects include building schools, installation of street lights, a 400-bed hospital, and a 
waste-disposal facility. 
Currently there are 500 aid workers working in Somalia.  These workers included doctors, nurses, 
midwives, engineers, and even personnel from Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs.  In 2011, 
400 Somalis arrived in Turkey to receive religious training.  In 2012, the Istanbul Conference 
hosted 300 representatives from Somali civil society. 
Sudan has also been at the forefront of Turkish humanitarian and civilian assistance. In fact, Turkey 
has been interacting with Sudan since its independence in 1956.  The two countries have a free 
trade agreement and several bilateral agreements. Due to the country’s wide civil unrest, conflicts 
and war, Turkey’s CIV/CAP efforts aim to address the needs of internally displaced peoples 
(IDPs).  Efforts are focused on acute humanitarian need – specifically medical, accommodation, 
and water.  Currently 40 unarmed military and police personnel serve the UN/African Union 
peacekeeping mission in Darfur. TIKA, the Turkish Red Crescent Society, Humanitarian Relief 
Organization, and Kisme Yok Mu – a Gülen affiliated educational organization are active in 
Darfur.  
Turkish reconstruction teams in Sudan have so far built the Nyala Field Hospital, overseen the 
delivery and installation of water well drilling apparatus. They have trained experts at cataract 
surgery center and provided training for agricultural engineers, focusing especially on vineyard 
and greenhouse development.  They have also managed the Otac Refugee Camp and treated over 
400,000 patients at the Nyala Field Hospital since 2006. Between 2007 and 2009, Sudan received 
nearly $45 million in official humanitarian assistance from Turkey. The number of the Sudanese 
that received civilian capacity training in Turkey in 2007 surpassed 1500. 
(We analyzed Turkey’s CIV/CAP efforts in Tunisia, Egypt, Liberia, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire but outside of military support, summary 
statistics were low.)
III. THE EXISTING APPROACH IN TURKEY TO PROVIDING CIVCAP
Given the brief history of Turkey’s active involvement in civilian capacity provision, it is fair 
to say that efficient decision-making and coordination mechanisms have yet to be put in 
place. The existing planning and executive infrastructure can hardly keep up with Turkey’s 
commendable vision to expand its civilian capacity assistance in both space and scale.  That 
system worked when Turkish assistance extended to conflict-affected areas was mostly military 
and peacekeeping missions.  However, as Turkey has moved beyond military assistance and 
focused its capacity on civilian and technical assistance in the last decade, its need for a stronger 
organizational infrastructure has also grown. Currently, there is not a systematic and methodical 
decision-making procedure for civilian capacity deployment.  We have not identified any rosters 
available at the agencies governing aid and assistance programs; nor has research yielded any 
pre-deployment or post-deployment evaluation models.  
Current CIVCAP deployment decisions are taken at the discretion of the Prime Minister’s office, 
senior cabinet posts such as the foreign affairs, development, defense, education, and health 
ministries. The directives are often communicated to TIKA through the senior government 
bureaucracy.  In the reverse order, a request may also come from a potential recipient through 
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a TIKA office in that particular country.  In the capacity of a matchmaker, TIKA passes the 
request to the appropriate ministry.  In return, the designated ministry, or sometimes a high-
level government agency, decides on how much aid it will provide as well as the number and 
qualifications of the personnel it may deploy.  All of these decisions are made on an individual 
basis. Furthermore, a few staffers interviewed for this study on the condition of anonymity 
claimed that some government offices even offer deployment as a means of promotion for their 
staff.  
TIKA is the central coordinating and monitoring institution for Turkey’s ODA.  It was officially 
recognized by the Prime Minister through law number 4668 (two circulars issued:  2005/11; 
2007/12701).  TIKA is a conduit; it does not hold decision making power to generate initiatives 
nor does it hold budgetary control.  There are four funding sources for TIKA initiatives:  a 
central budget; project based special funds appropriated by the Prime Ministry; funds received 
on behalf of other governmental institutions and; those received through international 
commitments.  Turkey’s official and “net” aid figures for development assistance between 2007-
2011 are as follows:
Administrative staff are responsible for “executing” CIVCAP (although not referred to in 
this way) directives from the Government, Prime Ministry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
President.  They do this by interfacing with other governmental organizations and coordinating 
efforts with Turkish organizations or entities within recipient countries. TIKA also acts as a 
liaison between IGOs/Multi-lateral donors and on-site project leaders.
TIKA’s headquarters is in Ankara, but it coordinates initiatives through 33 offices outside of Turkey, 
and it is currently working in 30 countries throughout the world.  It implements approximately 
100 projects per year. As mentioned earlier, the locus of TIKA’s efforts are concentrated in South 
and East Asia, the Middle East, Europe (the Balkan region), and Africa – although assistance 
projects have also been implemented in the Americas and Oceania.  Operational foci include:  
capacity building assistance, dispatching experts, donating equipment, financing infrastructure 
and construction projects, and extending humanitarian assistance.  The primary areas of TIKA’s 
operational concern are:  development of social infrastructure, development of economic 
infrastructure, development of production sectors, cultural cooperation (specifically focused 
on improving communication and social peace), and acute humanitarian efforts.  Turkey’s two 
strongest “niches” are in the areas of construction and agriculture.  
Because TIKA acts as a governmental channel, there are different protocols for its strategic 
planning and decision making.  The most common way in which development effort programs 
are negotiated is through project/aid proposals.  First, a potential aid recipient submits a 
proposal.  When a proposal is accepted by TIKA, administrators will also initiate coordination of 
the project.  For example, if the Ministry of Justice in Sudan proposes judicial branch/legislative 
training and the project is accepted, TIKA personnel in Sudan work through TIKA/Ankara 
who subsequently outsource training from the Ministry of Justice in Ankara.  These types of 
projects are demand driven and bi-laterally interfaced.  In a similar scenario, the Ministry of 
Justice of Sudan may contact the Ministry of Justice directly.  TIKA would assist both ministries 
and facilitate the coordination of efforts. A second protocol for projects directives may come 
Official Aid (in million USD) Net Aid (in million USD)
2007 602,24 1,336 
2008 780,36 1,576,75
2009 707,17 1,519,65
2010 967 1,718
2011 1,273 2,363,45
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directly from TIKA, the government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Ministry, or the 
President.  
It is not customary for TIKA to deploy its own personnel.  Although TIKA employees often hold 
expertise in the health, construction or agricultural sector, their role more typically involves 
initiating projects and serving as an inter-agency coordinator.  When TIKA does deploy one 
of their experts, it is because the project scope is substantial.  Turkish civilians who are sent 
abroad are personnel of Ministries or from public institutions.  Criteria for the deployment 
of these personnel are shaped by the priorities of Turkey’s foreign policy.  Civilians deployed 
through TIKA initiatives continue to receive their regular salary package along with additional 
travel stipends.  TIKA officials believe this budgetary framework is cost effective, and allows 
monies to remain project focused. Because TIKA coordinates and cooperates through various 
organizations, they have not institutionalized their own regulation or pre-deployment training 
processes.  Although most public or ministerial institutions deploying civilians have regulation 
guidelines and pre-deployment processes, preparation tends to be focused on the coordination 
of administrative details rather than personnel training.  Likewise, any post-deployment 
monitoring or in-country support would be sponsored by the deploying agency. TIKA has not 
institutionalized these processes.
Turkey remains acutely aware of the international analysis of global dynamics but prefers bi-
lateral development assistance arrangements.  Roughly 90 percent of aid efforts are coordinated 
directly between Turkey/TIKA and the donor recipient country.  The reasons Turkey prefers 
bilateral arrangements is because projects are more effective and easier to realize.  By law, if 
Turkey cooperates with an intergovernmental body, the Turkish Parliament must ratify the 
agreement.  This process is cumbersome and impractical, especially when timing is critical.  
Although Turkey typically chooses to bypass the inefficiency that often comes with increased 
party involvement, it does cooperate with some intergovernmental organizations such as:
•	 ECO   (ex.:  funding for the reconstruction of Afghanistan)
•	 FAO   (ex.:  agriculture)
•	 IsDB  (ex.:  capacity development)
•	 OECD  (ex.:  Istanbul Centre for Private Sector Development and PDG)
•	 UNDP  (ex.:  staff secondments, talent bank project)
•	 UNIDO  (ex.:  food safety)
•	 IOM   (ex.:  refugees/migration)
The following is a list of the non-governmental organizations that TIKA prefers to work through 
for their acute humanitarian assistance projects:
•	 Turkish Red Crescent 
•	 IHH  (Foundation for    
     Human Rights and Freedoms    
     and Humanitarian Relief)
•	 Doctors Worldwide:  Turkey
•	 Dost Eli Foundation 
•	 Türkiye Diyanet Foundation 
•	 Cansuyu Foundation 
•	 Yardımeli Foundation 
•	 Deniz Feneri 
•	 Education:  Gülistan         
      Foundation, Turgut Özal   
      Schools, Sema Foundation
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While there are several strengths to Turkey’s centralized approach to funneling development 
cooperation efforts through TIKA, there are a few noteworthy constraints.  According to TIKA 
officials the greatest weakness in this model is in the area of personnel deployment.  In particular, 
two vulnerabilities stand out: the level of expertise and personnel insurance packages, Because 
TIKA’s main function is to coordinate projects, it lacks the power to actually determine which 
experts are sent to their sites.  At times, ministries or public organizations send personnel as 
a reward or professional incentive instead of choosing the candidate who can best implement 
project goals.  Secondly, salary packages within institutions deploying personnel do not often 
include extra provision for overseas health, safety, and insurance needs.  Individuals and their 
families are not adequately insured.  In these scenarios, deployed personnel face more risks “in 
the field” yet their vulnerabilities are not compensated for through human resource safeguards.
Another limitation within the Turkish model is that TIKA lacks an internal mechanism to 
evaluate and/or develop best practices.  Concurrently, there are no “centers of excellence” in 
Turkey that offer CIVCAP training and deployment workshops, monitor the quality of project 
outcomes, or evaluate personnel.  Presently, there are no institutionalized and systematic 
methodologies for CIVCAP skill development, personnel supervision, or assessment of 
development cooperation efforts.  Although Turkey has signed a MoU to use the “Special Unit 
for South-South Cooperation’s” WIDE roster software, concern is shared that this methodology 
does not certify expertise. Presently, there is no internal sifting mechanism to assure a high level 
of match between professional competency and project demand.
A final constraint is that the Turkish language is not common in many of the countries where 
Turkey’s civilians are deployed.  If training in the recipient/donor country is done in English 
or the local language, the Turkish representative cannot benefit from those built-in support 
systems.  As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to expand the scope of aid initiatives 
outside Turkic Republics and post-Ottoman territories, this challenge will likely increase 
without supplemental language acquisition services or a requirement that personnel hold 
second language skills.
In brief, Turkey’s potential to scale up its valuable assistance programs can be exponentially 
increased with a strengthened decision-making and coordination framework.  Supported by 
rules, regulations, codes of conduct, and mandates, the suggested coordination system would be 
instrumental in the development of an efficient CIVCAP deployment process.  Pre-deployment, 
deployment, post-deployment evaluation models will enhance the efficiency and broaden the 
range of Turkey’s civilian assistance programs.  In fact, there is a growing awareness among key 
government offices of the importance of institutionalization of CIVCAP efforts.  As a matter of 
fact, traces of an institutionalized approach, and its benefits, can be found in recent humanitarian 
assistance programs that Turkey is carrying out in one of the most contentious conflict-affected 
countries: Afghanistan.  
IV. NATIONAL APPROACH TO PROVIDING EXPERTISE:  
Post 9/11 Afghanistan
“No Afghan was ever killed by a Turkish bullet….”
Turkish & Afghani maxim
Turkey entered the international “power” equation of post 9/11 Afghanistan with strategic 
clarity.  A long history of cultural and diplomatic connections between the two countries had 
existed since the establishment of their fledging statehoods in the early twentieth century.  This 
historical relationship seems to have shaped the geopolitical sensitivity which eventually set 
the foundation for Turkey’s expression of involvement through NATO’s International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF).  Initially, Turkey contributed to peacekeeping efforts by sending 
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300 soldiers, but under one condition; all of its troops would be defined as non-combatant 
forces.  Utilizing a combination of its military strength alongside the extension of a “soft power” 
approach, Turkey maintained resolute conviction that a purely military struggle would not be 
enough to assure human security or regional stability.
Although the military raised its contribution to 1,300 peacekeeping soldiers during Turkey’s 
command of ISAF (6/2002-2/2003 & 2/2005-8/2005), resources such as its unique status as a 
Muslim majority NATO member state, as well as its close diplomatic ties, enabled its leaders 
relatively active civic/political access as it began to help rebuild the country’s infrastructure.  
For example, former Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin held the post of NATO Senior 
Civilian Representative (1/2004 & 8/2006), Turkey’s 1,800 solider-strong military force operated 
the Kabul Regional Command in 2009, and Istanbul hosted the fourth Tripartite Summit 
meeting between Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in 2010. While Turkey’s efforts have been 
considerable in the context of Afghanistan, its commitment has been particularly expressed 
through the establishment of two Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
NATO’s first solely led civilian PRT was launched by Turkey in November 2006.  Based in 
Wardak, this team of 130 civilian operatives was administered by a civilian diplomat.  During the 
next four years, nearly 200 projects were completed.  Under the direction of Turkey’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) 
appropriated approximately $30 million USD development and capacity building efforts. 
The PRT in Wardak assisted Afghan authorities with reconstruction efforts and enhanced 
development and stability within the province. It focused on providing health care, education, 
police training and agricultural alternatives to local farmers. All projects were coordinated and 
structured to meet the benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact Document and the Interim 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy.  TIKA’s efforts aimed to improve the quality of life 
in Afghanistan through the re-construction of its sorely needed civil infrastructure.  Examples 
of completed projects include: 68 schools established or restored; nursing and midwifery 
education centers for women opened; 250 tons of humanitarian aid handed out; 17 hospitals 
and outpatient clinics built or reconstructed; thousands of Afghan police officers and soldiers 
trained; education programs for judges, prosecutors and district governors provided, and 
several roads, bridges and wells completed.  In addition to the aid and assistance given through 
TIKA during this timeframe, Turkish entrepreneurs also completed projects worth nearly $2 
billion USD.  
PRT Jawzjan
After careful deliberation and several consultations between Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu and the Afghan Government, a second PRT for the northern provinces of 
Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul was established in 2010. For purposes of the CIVCAP case study, we have 
chosen to focus more closely on this PRT because it is currently operating.  We were able to 
access a wide scope of research data by speaking directly with PRT Deputy Coordinator Ali 
Erbaş. Headquartered in the city center of Shibirghan, the Jawzjan PRT is led by a Civilian Head 
(senior diplomat) and a Civilian Deputy Head (diplomatic staff) from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  A staff of 22 administrative personnel coordinate the efforts of the approximately 220 
deployed experts and advisors who represent the Turkish Ministry of Education, Ministry of 
Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Interior, TIKA, Presidency of Religious Affairs, 
several universities, and a Police Special Operations Team.  The following is a list of current 
positions, how many civilians are deployed in that role, and the duration of their deployments:
Permanent assignments from 1 to 8 years:
•	 PRT Leader/Coordinator (Senior Diplomat): 1 (1 year)
•	 PRT Deputy Coordinator (Diplomatic staff): 1 (over 2 years)
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•	 Development Program Coordinator (TIKA): 1 (1 year)
•	 Medical doctor: 1 (8 years)
•	 Pedagogical Advisor: 1 ( 1 year)
•	 Police Training Coordinator: 1 
 (1 year)
•	 Agricultural Advisor: 1 (1 year) 
•	 Teachers (numbers may vary): 11 
 (1 to 5 years)
•	 Project Manager: 1 (3 years)
Temporary Assignments 3 to 6 months:
•	 Health Advisor: 1 (6 months)
•	 CPT (Close Protection Team/Turkish National Police [considered as civilian within the   
 concept of NATO-ISAF]: 22 (3 months)
Temporary Assignments up to 1 month:
•	 Academics (Prof  & Assc Prof. level): Education, 15
•	 Pedagogical formation
•	 Lab equipment application
•	 Academics(Prof  & Assc Prof. level): Agriculture, 3
•	 Combating insects 
•	 Plantation techniques
•	 Academics (Prof  level): Theology, 1
•	 Religious affairs
•	 Police Superintendents: 11
•	 Training of police trainers
•	 Crime scene investigation
•	 Experts: Watering/Irrigation (DSİ, General Directorate Of State Hydraulic Works): 3
•	 Dam/irrigation projects
•	 Health: 1
•	 Combating leshmaina tropica 
•	 Theology: 4
•	 Religious services/Mosque Projects
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Type and Volume of Assistance
Originally, Jawzjan PRT’s objectives were modeled after the Wardak PRT with specific focus 
given to Development Projects (DP) and Capacity Building Projects (CBP).  A unique addition 
to the Jawzjan PRT is Quick Impact Projects (QIP); these take place over a shorter and more 
intense period of time. TIKA’s responsibility is to coordinate, assist in implementation, and 
monitor the development of these projects in close cooperation with PRT administration and 
the contracted agency. There are no legal frameworks in place with the recipient entities to 
initiate or sustain projects. Instead, project determinations are based upon the assessment of 
on-the-ground needs and formal UN or Afghan Government protocols which include:
•	 Operations in line with the UN Security Council Resolutions and overall objectives of         
 NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan;
•	 Preparation of projects in close consultation with provincial authorities; 
•	 Meeting the priorities of the Afghan Government and needs of the local people;
•	 Assisting in development of and monitoring Provincial Development Plans;
•	 Ensuring effective donor coordination/cooperation to avoid duplication; 
•	 Pursuit of Afghan-first procurement policy. 
Overall project priorities include education, health, police training, agriculture, and gender 
participation.  The following is a list of projects initiated between July 2010-August 2012.  
Development and Capacity Building Projects 
Budget:  $ 3,4 M 
•	 3 High Schools for girls – Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul Provinces
•	 Health Centers - Jawzjan Province
•	 Health Center - Sar-i Pul Province
•	 Combating «heishmania tropica» – Aqcha 
•	 Training Courses for Health Workers– Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul 
•	 Supporting/donating technical equipment to Local TV-Radio (RTA Jawzjan) 
•	 Program to Combat Melon Fly – Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul
•	 Visit of local media representatives to Turkey for capacity to Turkey
•	 Supporting computer, English language and handicraft courses initiated by the Women        
 Affairs Department of Jawjzjan
•	 Supporting courses on women’s rights, English language and handicraft skills initiated by   
 the Women Affairs Department of Sar-i Pul
•	 Training medical staff from Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul in Turkey 
•	 40 undergraduate (24 boys and 16 girls), and 6 graduate  scholarships (4 boys 2 girls) for    
 the students from Jawzjand and Sar-ı Pul [Not included to the general budget]
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•	 Gender programming for social participation, empowerment and gender equality;   
 conducting cooking class on Turkish cuisine together with Jawzjan Women Affairs   
 Department (which are broadcasted weekly on local TV)
•	 Visit of Women Affair Department and relevant representatives to Turkey 
•	 Complimentary health service for lower income patients provided together with PRT’s   
 military component (45-55 patients per day) with 1 military doctor, 1 local civilian female  
 doctor, 2 nurses,1 health technician and 2 translators assisting with communication issues 
•	 Short seminars on family and child care courses for women
•	 In partnership with NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, within the   
 framework of “Silk Afghanistan” project, implementation of high speed internet    
 infrastructure project at Jawzjan University, to enable internet connection for educational  
 enhancement and networking capabilities, as well as to promote distance learning    
 activities between Jawzjan University and international higher education     
 institutions. [119.500 Euro/not included in the budget.]
•	 Additional building for the Institute of Education, consisting of 2 classes, a library and an   
 administration office
•	 Public fountain at city centre (municipality grounds)
•	 Training for Jawzjan Police Trainers (2 wk course for 16 ANP policemen conducted by 2   
 Police trainers from TR)
•	 Teacher development/training courses for 100 teachers (3 wk course for each of group   
 delivered by 6 academics from TR. Attended by 50 teachers in Sarı Pul, 50 teachers   
 in Jawzjan)
•	 Training for Sarı Pul Police Trainers in Jawzjan (2 wk course for 15 ANP policemen   
 conducted by 2 Police trainers from TR)
•	 Teacher development courses for 150 science teachers on Laboratory equipment and Lab   
 usage in teaching (2 wk course for each of group delivered by 6 academics from TR    
 Attended by 75 teachers in Sarı Pul, 75 teachers in Jawzjan)
•	 Building of a park/recreation area in a designated section at the University of Jawzjan
Quick Impact Projects
Budget:  $ 6,000,000
•	 Support for the Shibirghan Ring Road Project 
•	 Food aid during Ramadan 2010
•	 Food aid during Ramadan 2011
•	 Food aid during Ramadan 2012
•	 Flood mitigation (Amu Derya River) 
•	 Stationary, equipment and kitchen ware donation to Shibirghan Prison 
•	 Supporting cultural/sporting life: Stage-I: Renovation of Shibirghan Buzkashi Stadium   
 (2011) 
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•	 Supporting cultural/sporting life: Stage-II-Expansion phase: Renovation of Shibirghan   
 Buzkashi Stadium (2012) 
•	 Supporting cultural/sporting life: Stage-III: Building the Buzkashi stadium surrounding   
 Wall/Wing phase (2012)
•	 Supporting cultural/sporting life: Stage-IV: Building the Buzkashi stadium surrounding   
 Wall/Expanded area (2012)
•	 Support for Aqcha District Governor’s Peace and Reconciliation Activities and for the   
 renovation of his Office 
•	 Support for Departments of Women Affairs in Jawzjan & Sar-i Pul during Women’s Day   
 activities 
•	 Repair of school buildings in Shibirgan and Aqcha
•	 Drinking water supply for Cerimgerhane Girls School during the draught season
•	 Renovation and furnishing of Jawzjan Governor’s Office garden
•	 Furniture supply for Jawjzjan Province Police Department
•	 Drinking water infrastructure supply for Hoca Dukhu district
•	 Watering infrastructure for Cengelbag orchard and agricultural land during the drought   
 season 
•	 Mobile health service in Sar-i Pul Province
•	 Renovation of the landscape of Shibirghan Police Training Centre 
•	 Landscaping of the environment of Aqcha District Governor’s building
•	 Courses for personal development, handicraft and child care in Aqcha district initiated by  
 Turkish teachers
•	 Technical equipment support for the Jawzjan Cultural Affairs Department
•	 Food and clothes supply for Jawjzjan orphanage
•	 Fuel supply for  provincial and  district municipalities
•	 Renovation of the Science Department of Jawzjan University
•	 Stationary/useable goods donation to Haticei Cevizcani Girls High School
•	 Winter clothing donation to Sheberghan Orphange; 
•	 Meat distribution (food security) during Eid Ahad (2010)
•	 Meat distribution (food security) during Eid Ahad (2011)
•	 Winter fuel assistance to Jawzjan Hospital
There are also two on-going “flagship” projects with an annual budget of $1,075 M that began 
prior to the onset of the PRT:
•	 Turkish-Afghan Friendship Hospital for Children in Shibirghan - Jawzjan (825.000 USD/  
 year - since 2004)
•	 Habibe Kadiri High School for Girls in Aqcha District - Jawzjan (250.000 USD/year - since  
 2008)
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Turkey’s approach to PRT personnel is intentional and specific.  Cultural sensitivity and safety 
measures are considered a high priority.  The cultural and social challenges of working in 
post-war Afghanistan are addressed through orientation trainings, on-going education, and 
consistent psychological support.  Briefing and debriefing are seen as critical and essential for 
the success of the PRT’s mission.  Cultural education, religious sensitivity, and local knowledge 
are not only seen as ethically responsible, but also pragmatic.  Additionally, local PRT staff 
may also go through an orientation program.  For example, several Afghani staff members 
responsible for Media, Public Relations, and Women’s Affairs were sent to Turkey for training 
and capacity building.  The success of Turkey’s approach to PRTs is partly attributed to the 
deliberate ways in which personnel engage with the community.  Their methodology remains 
more uniform because TIKA coordinates projects through Turkish institutions.  Secondments 
and the provision of personnel by other inter-governmental entities are minimal and 
unnecessary.  (Note:  Turkish civilian personnel, however, are offered or deployed to the UN 
to assist in monitoring/analyzing political, economic and security situations, reporting major 
security incidents, and coordinating sectorial/inter-agency meetings.) Turkey has also tasked a 
military staff comprising of approximately 100 staff members to protect the PRT compound and 
personnel.  Additionally, 32 Turkish Special Operations Police (SOP) provide close protection 
to the civilian leadership team and teachers who are currently working at Habibe Kadiri Girls 
School.
General Lessons Learned
Continuous formal evaluations of the Jawzjan projects indicate Turkey’s civilian led approach 
to Afghanistan PRTs has been successful and objective. Wardak and Jawzjan PRTs were 
conceptualized and designed for constructive civil society engagement by intervening Turkish 
and Afghani institutions/vectors at multiple levels.  PRT administrators recognize that a 
sustainable transition requires obtaining confidence of the people, a strategic political and 
development process, and the reintegration of Afghan civilians into leadership roles.  Without 
the fear attached to a strong/foreign military presence, these PRTs have managed to develop 
quality and strong in local partnerships.  Current emphasis is being given to the transference 
of management and transitioning processes by building Afghani civilian leadership for the 
expressed purposes of sustainability, local governance, and community ownership.
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A closer look at Turkey’s civilian capacity and its ability to deploy this resource efficiently 
uncovers important opportunities, while it also cautions against a few perils that should not be 
ignored.  Turkey’s greatest advantage today is the visionary foreign policy that the government 
has pursued for the last decade.  It has been due to this vision that Turkey has successfully 
identified and mapped global concerns. By remaining closely engaged with the majority of 
the conflict-affected nations and the least developed countries in the world, Turkey  correctly 
assesses that at the root of most conflicts today lie unequal distribution of resources, neglecting 
the grievances of the world’s least developed communities, and the lack of dialogue between 
conflicting parties.  Cognizant of these realities, Turkey has dramatically altered its approach to 
assistance to conflict-ridden areas.  In the last five years, it has increased technical and civilian 
capacity assistance to post-conflict zones and reduced its engagement in military peacekeeping 
missions that would require it to take on combat operations. We see this particularly in 
Afghanistan.  
With available coordination infrastructure, that is, TIKA, Turkey has already achieved tangible 
projects.  As mentioned earlier, it has provided training to judges and prosecutors in Pakistan, 
police forces in Afghanistan, and cataract surgeons in Somalia. Turkish experts have trained 
local farmers, female laborers, teachers, and engineers over a vast territory from the Balkans 
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to Southeast Asia. Yet, even these important achievements in modest numbers have put 
considerable strain on the existing coordination mechanism. Moreover, in the absence of a 
reliable monitoring and evaluation model, measuring and emulating the success rates of some 
of these operations prove almost impossible.
There is very little information available to TIKA today regarding the strengths, weaknesses, 
threats, and opportunities of the programs it is coordinating. The same is true for the ministries, 
which are the original suppliers of financial and personnel resources to these missions.  The lack 
of pre-deployment assessment leaves many in the dark with respect to whether the resources 
are directed towards the right targets. In the absence of a decision making protocol, some 
might suspect that aid and assistance may be channeled not according to the realities on the 
ground, but common ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural features that the donor recipients 
may share with Turkey. Similarly, the current coordination model pays very little attention to 
post-deployment evaluation. This means the coordination agency has to work with limited 
data on the strengths that can be emulated by other teams and the weaknesses that could be 
averted through careful planning and the effective use of resources. Another critical issue is an 
insufficient number of women deployed as part of civilian capacity missions.  
The assessment of these challenges leads to the following policy recommendations that the 
Turkish government might consider in order to improve its civilian capacity programs and 
expand their outreach.  Most important is to devise an efficient decision making body that 
would have the mandate to make executive decisions on engagement, the type and source of 
the assistance, and oversight on the coordination processes.  Next, TIKA has great potential 
to become a center of excellence provided that it either establishes a functional evaluation 
program or partners with an external monitoring agency to establish a quality control net over 
its operations.  Moreover, no civilian capacity assistance that Turkey provides in the future will 
have the desired social impact without the participation of women in large numbers.  Turkey 
is likely to face credibility problems if the government neglects to involve not only Turkish 
women’s organizations, but other NGOs in the process.  It is difficult to talk with integrity 
about skills-development projects targeting the female labor force in conflict-affected countries 
without a single female trainer in a civilian assistance team. Finally, Turkish CIVCAP efforts 
may consider taking more advantage of multilateral frameworks.  By working closely with and 
through highly credible and influential frameworks such as the UN and OECD, not only will 
Turkey expand its CIVCAP networks, but its executive and coordination facilities will also 
become more transparent, organized, and resourceful. By the same token, such multilateral 
initiatives would enable Turkey to learn from the good practices of other countries and share its 
successful undertakings with them. 
In conclusion, Turkey is at an opportune crossroads to increase its civilian capacity and provide 
more value-added assistance to conflict affected countries. It has great potential to initiate civilian 
projects on political reforms, democratization, ensuring basic government functionality and 
jump-starting their economies.  The Afghanistan case already demonstrates Turkey’s aptitude 
in all of these areas. In addition, its foreign policy with commitment to peace and stability 
speaks to Turkey’s resolve to take on these challenges. With the proper executive, planning and 
coordination facilities in place, supported by increased NGO participation and exchange of 
resources on a symmetrical multilateral framework, Turkey is on a promising path to fulfilling 
its role as a reliable provider of civilian assistance.
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ANNEX I
Republic of Turkey:  Aid Development Statistics 2007-2010
2007
I     Total Development Aid of Turkey:   $602,24 M Official Aid
      $1,336   BN Net Aid
List of largest aid recipients (Million USD $)
•	 Afghanistan     $ 71,61 M 
•	 Kyrgyzstan    $ 69,56 M 
•	 Iraq      $ 46,68 M 
•	 Kazakhstan     $ 42,81 M 
•	 Azerbaijan     $ 36,22 M 
•	 Pakistan    $ 33,47 M 
•	 Kosovo    $ 25,54 M 
•	 Turkmenistan     $ 19,84 M 
•	 Bosnia and Herzegovina   $ 15,86 M 
•	 Lebanon     $ 15,70 M 
•	 Sudan      $ 15,46 M 
•	 Palestine     $ 14,22 M 
•	 Saudi Arabia     $ 12,51 M 
•	 Mongolia     $ 10,51 M 
II    Deployed Civilians/Regions:
Various Sectors:  2,346 Turkish civilian consultants/experts were sent abroad to provide training:
Education Sector:  2,104 Turkish personnel were sent abroad:
•	 Kyrgyzstan     730
•	 Saudi Arabia     311
•	 Azerbaijan     198
•	 Kazakhstan     165
•	 Ukraine       98
•	 Bosnia and Herzegovina     95
•	 Turkmenistan       84
•	 Iraq        47
•	 Kosovo       44
•	 Uzbekistan       26
•	 Moldova       24
•	 Afghanistan       18
•	 Georgia       17
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Health Sector:  243 health sector personnel (doctors, nurses etc.) came to Turkey for a period of 
min. 3 months, max.  1 year to receive training. They were mostly from Afghanistan, Sudan and 
Azerbaijan. This training is given in order to increase their social infrastructure. 
Donor recipient guests:  7,018 experts received training in Turkey:
•	 Azerbaijan     654
•	 Palestine     553
•	 Georgia     515
•	 Afghanistan     450
•	 Sudan      393
•	 Uzbekistan     347
•	 Tajikistan     343
•	 Kosovo     337
•	 Kyrgyzstan     269
•	 Iraq      259
•	 Mongolia     232
•	 Macedonia     230
•	 Bosnia and Herzegovina   203
•	 Kazakhstan     199
•	 Turkmenistan     153
•	 Ukraine     153
•	 Ethiopia     142 
III   Public Institutions contributing to ODA:
Ministry of Education   34% 
TIKA      12%
Turkish Armed Forces    10%
Turkish National Police           9%
Presidency of Religious Affairs                  5%
IV   Non-governmental organizations contributing to aid assistance:  
Total aid:      $ 55,38 M
•	 Pakistan     $ 10,98 M 
•	 Palestine     $   4,58 M 
•	 Niger      $   2,81 M 
•	 Bosnia-Herzegovina    $   2,79 M 
•	 Azerbaijan     $   2,10 M 
•	 Lebanon    $   1,82 M 
•	 Bangladesh     $   1,80 M 
•	 Ethiopia    $   1,72 M 
•	 Macedonia     $   1,69 M 
•	 Kosovo    $   1,66 M 
•	 Afghanistan     $   1,41 M 
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•	 Albania     $   1,26 M 
•	 Iraq     $   1,19 M 
•	 Sudan      $   1,14 M 
•	 NGOs opened 106 deep water wells primarily in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Niger.
•	 In the health sector, NGOs realized 2,234 cataract operations, 243 hernia operations, 112 
dental operations, more than 2,000 controlling and 1,120 circumcision operations. 
V  Offices and Countries:  TIKA
As of 2007 TIKA had 22 coordination offices and realized projects in 86 different countries. 
If we calculate the official development aid made by all the state agencies, the total number of 
countries receiving aid from Turkey in 2007 was 131.   These offices are located in:
1. Afghanistan 2. Albania, 3. Azerbaijan 4. Bosnia-Herzegovina 5. Ethiopia 6. Palestine 7. 
Georgia 8. Kazakhstan 9. Kosovo 10. Kirghizstan 11. Macedonia 12. Moldova 13. Mongolia 14. 
Montenegro 15. Uzbekistan 16. Senegal 17. Sudan 18. Tajikistan 19. Turkmenistan 20. Ukraine 
VI  Regional Distribution of TIKA Aid
56.63% Caucasus and Central Asia
26.83% Europe (Balkans and Eastern Europe)
12.87% Middle East and Africa
VII Percentage of Aid Distribution:  TIKA
•	 Afghanistan     36.22%
•	 Macedonia       6.03%
•	 Mongolia       5.32%
•	 Palestine       4.37%
•	 Moldova       4.25%
•	 Ukraine          4.01%
VIII Sector Distribution of TIKA Aid (following OECD/DAC sector classification)
•	 Social Infrastructure and Services 77,4 % 
•	 Education     24,6 %
•	 Health     13.3 % 
•	 Water and Hygiene     7.6 %
•	 Public and Civil Infrastructures    8.4 %
•	 Other Social Services    20.4 %
•	 Economic Infrastructure   12.71% 
•	 Production Sector      7.99%
•	 Multi-Sectors      .15% 
•	 Emergency Aid     1.75%
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2008
I     Total Development Aid of Turkey:   $780,36 M Official Aid
      $ 1,576.75 BN Net Aid
      List of largest aid recipients (Million USD $)
•	 Afghanistan     $141,96M 
•	 Pakistan     $ 84,31 M 
•	 Kazakhstan     $ 61,56 M 
•	 Kyrgyzstan     $ 53      M 
•	 Iraq      $ 47,68 M 
•	 Azerbaijan     $ 33,90 M 
•	 Lebanon     $ 26,59 M 
•	 Kosovo     $ 26,58 M 
•	 Palestine     $ 20,18 M 
•	 Georgia     $ 16,85 M 
•	 Bosnia and Herzegovina   $ 15,92 M 
•	 Iran      $ 15,45 M 
•	 Sudan     $ 13,22 M 
•	 Moldova     $ 13,20 M 
II    Deployed Civilians/Regions:
Donor recipient guests:    5525 experts received training in Turkey:
•	 Sudan     1330
•	 Albania    619
•	 Turkmenistan    589
•	 Kosovo    557
•	 Azerbaijan    543
•	 Georgia    474
Health sector:  435 health sector personnel (doctors, nurses etc.) came to Turkey for a period of 
min. 3 months, max.  1 year to receive training.
III   Public Institutions contributing to ODA:
Ministry of Education    18.78% 
TIKA      16.13%
Turkish National Police    15.69%
Turkish Armed Forces    10.63% 
Presidency of Religious      6.42%
IV  Post-conflict reconstruction efforts in 2008
Countries receiving aid under the auspices of post-conflict reconstruction and peace building:
•	 Afghanistan     $ 22,16 M  
•	 Kosovo     $ 11,98 M 
•	 Macedonia    404
•	 Kyrgyzstan    390
•	 Mongolia    211
•	 Bosnia and Herzegovina  173
•	 Montenegro    124
•	 Syria     111
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•	 Lebanon     $   8,31 M 
•	 Bosnia and Herzegovina   $   8,2   M 
•	 Other      $   0,9   M ( Albania, Congo)
•	 Afghanistan – Contribution to ISAF: 267 military personnel
•	 UNIFIL – 237 military personnel and 24 civilian. (261 in total) 
V Offices and Countries:  TIKA
As of 2008 TIKA had 23 PCOs in 20 countries and realized projects in 111 different countries.
In 2008 Turkey was elected for the UN Security Council, and, to that end, Turkey increased the 
aid rate towards Africa. The aid for Oceania was increased for a similar reason; Turkey paid the 
debts of some small island countries. 
VI  Regional Distribution of TIKA Aid
53.89%      Caucasus and Central Asia
24.58%      Europe (Balkans and Eastern Europe)
15.43%      Middle East and Africa
  2.29%      Oceania
  3.80%      Other 
VII Percentage of Aid Distribution:  TIKA
•	 Afghanistan   44.58%
•	 Moldova   6.96%
•	 Palestine   4.17%
VIII Sector Distribution of TIKA Aid (following OECD/DAC sector classification)
•	 Social Infrastructure and Services  79.53%
•	 Economic Infrastructure   10.62 %
•	 Production Sector      3.93% 
•	 Multi-Sectors       2.91%
•	 Emergency Aids      3.01%
•	 Kosovo    3.96%
•	 Macedonia    3.68%
•	 Sudan     3.39%
30
2009
I     Total Development Aid of Turkey:   $707.17 M Official Aid
      $ 1,519.65 BN Net Aid
List of largest aid recipients (Million USD $)
•	 Afghanistan     $ 96,46 M 
•	 Kyrgyzstan     $ 67,72 M 
•	 Kazakhstan     $ 62,53 M 
•	 Iraq      $ 51,33 M 
•	 Palestine     $ 48,20 M 
•	 Bosnia and Herzegovina   $ 32,75 M 
•	 Pakistan     $ 29,86 M 
•	 Azerbaijan     $ 27,20 M 
•	 Kosovo     $ 20,63 M 
•	 Iran      $ 14,80 M 
•	 Sudan      $ 14,58 M 
•	 Georgia     $ 13,77 M 
•	 Turkmenistan     $ 12,69 M 
•	 Lebanon     $ 11,53 M 
•	 Uzbekistan     $ 8,84   M 
•	 Albania     $ 8,61   M 
•	 Mongolia     $ 6,96   M 
•	 Ukraine     $ 6,92   M 
•	 Macedonia     $ 6        M 
II    Deployed Civilians/Regions:
Donor recipient guests:  5733 experts from various sectors received trainings in Turkey:
•	 Regional     1383
•	 Azerbaijan       686
•	 Afghanistan       680
•	 Palestine       349
•	 Turkmenistan       300
•	 Kazakhstan       276
•	 Mongolia       152
•	 Albania       141
•	 Uzbekistan       119
•	 Georgia       110
•	 Bosnia and Herzegovina     104
•	 Kyrgyzstan       100
•	 Other          1333
III  Post-conflict reconstruction efforts in 2009 ($51,96 M )
Countries receiving aid in the framework of post-conflict reconstruction and peace building:
TURKEY’S CIVILIAN CAPACITY 
IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
31
•	 Afghanistan     $ 27,87 M 
•	 Kosovo     $ 10,76 M
•	 Bosnia and Herzegovina   $   8,07 M 
•	 Lebanon     $   4,88 M 
•	 Other      $     .39 M 
IV  Public Institutions contributing to ODA:
•	 TIKA      20.29%
•	 Ministry of Education   18.78% 
•	 Turkish Armed Forces   12.42% 
•	 Turkish National Police   10.57%
•	 Kyrgyzstan:Turkey Manas University 5.95%
•	 Presidency of Religious Affairs            5.43%
V   Non-governmental organizations contributing to aid assistance:  
•	 IHH
•	 Türkiye Diyanet Foundation
•	 Turkish World Research Foundation 
•	 Dost Eli Foundation 
VI Offices and Countries:  TIKA
As of 2009 TIKA had 26 PCOs coordination offices in 23 countries; new PCOs were established 
in Pakistan, Serbia and Syria. 
VII Regional Distribution of TIKA Aid
44.44%  Caucasus and Central Asia
26.85% Europe (Balkans and Eastern Europe)
24.68%  Middle East and Africa
  3.87% Far East
VIII Percentage of Aid Distribution:  TIKA
•	 Afghanistan     20.61%
•	 Bosnia-Herzegovina    6.76%
•	 Palestine     5.47%
•	 Lebanon     3.89%
•	 Georgia     3.76%
•	 Kosovo     3.2 %
IX Sector Distribution of TIKA Aid (following OECD/DAC sector classification)
1.  Social Infrastructure and Services  79.78% 
2.  Economic Infrastructure   6.52%
3.  Production Sector     10.53% 
4.  Multi-Sectors     3.17%
•	 Yardımeli Foundation 
•	 Deniz Feneri 
•	 Cansuyu Foudation 
•	 Worldwide Doctors
32
2010
I     Total Development Aid   $   967  M Official Aid
      $1,718  BN Net Aid
List of largest aid recipients (Million USD $)
•	 Pakistan     $ 134,49 M
•	 Afghanistan     $ 107,8   M
•	 Kyrgyzstan     $   83,81 M
•	 Kazakhstan     $   53,76 M
•	 Iraq      $   39,31 M    
II   Offices and Countries:  TIKA
As of 2010 TIKA had 28 PCOs coordination offices in 25 countries. Turkey provided $ 10 M in 
aid to 34 countries in Africa as of 2010 via TIKA
III Regional Distribution of TIKA Aid
36.65%      Caucasus and Central Asia
29.79%      Europe (Balkans and Eastern Europe)
31.63%      Middle East and Africa 
  0.99%      Far East
  0.94%      Other Countries
IV Percentage of Aid Distribution:  TIKA
•	 Afghanistan     24.54%
•	 Macedonia     14.93%
•	 Lebanon     14.72%
•	 Montenegro       5.75%
•	 Palestine       3.33% 
•	 Kazakhstan       3.18%
V  Sector Distribution of TIKA Aid (following OECD/DAC sector classification)
•	 Social Infrastructure and Services  79.53% 
•	 Economic Infrastructure   10.62% 
•	 Production Sector      3.93% 
•	 Multi-Sectors       2.91%
•	 Emergency Aids       .60%
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2011
I     Total Development Aid   $1,273       M Official Aid
      $2,363,45  BN Net Aid
List of largest aid recipients (Million USD $)
•	 Pakistan     $ 204,95 M
•	 Syria      $ 162,03 M
•	 Afghanistan     $ 130,89 M
•	 Somalia     $   93,89 M
•	 Kyrgyzstan     $   83,81 M 
Notes:
Total assistance aid designated for post-conflict reconstruction and peace building:
2005        $ 23,22 M 
2006       $ 36,31 M 
2007        $ 54,06 M 
2008       $ 51,55 M 
2009       $ 51,96 M 
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International Organizations in Turkey:
Black Sea Port State Control Secretariat
Developing 8 Countries (D-8)
ECO Trade and Development Bank (ECOBANK)
European Investment Bank
Food and Agriculture Organization Of The United Nations (FAO)
GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF COOPERATION COUNCIL OF TURKISH SPEAKING 
STATES
International Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
International Labour Organization (ILO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Organization For Migration (IOM)
Islamic Conference Youth Forum (ICYF)
Organization of International Turkish Culture (TÜRKSOY)
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Permanent International Secretariat 
(BSEC)
Organization of The Islamic Cooperation Research Centre For Islamic History, 
Art And Culture (IRCICA)
Parliamentary Assembly  of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC)
Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC)
The Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution 
The Mission of the League of Arab States 
The Office United Nations Population Fund Eastern Europe and Central Asia Regional Office 
(EECARO)
United Nations (Resident Coordinator)
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
United Nations Information Center (UNIC)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
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United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
World Bank Country Office (WB) 
World Health Organization (WHO)
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Karakoy Headquarters
Bankalar Caddesi, 
No: 2  Minerva Han
34420 Karakoy
Istanbul / Turkey
T: +90 212 292 4939 / 1417 ext.
F: +90 212 292 4957
